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Abstract
Special economic zones, one of the most important instruments of industrial policy in devel-
oping countries, often feature export share requirements. That is, firms located in these zones
are obliged to export more than a certain stated share of their output to enjoy the wide ar-
ray of incentives available there, a practice prohibited by the World Trade Organization. This
paper exploits the staggered removal of export requirements across products and over time in
the special economic zones of the Dominican Republic to evaluate whether the importance of
exports originating from the zones was affected by the elimination of export requirements. The
findings show that entry increased among firms in special economic zones, while the average
value of export transactions fell for existing exporters following the reforms. At the same time,
continuous exporters were unaffected by the policy change, possibly because these firms were not
constrained by the export requirement. Overall, special economic zones became more important
with respect to the number of exporters based there but not in terms of the value of exports.
The findings suggest that the elimination of performance requirements made it more attractive
for firms to be based in special economic zones.
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1 Introduction
On July 31, 2007, the General Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) set December 31st
2015 as the final deadline for the elimination of export subsidies in the Dominican Republic and 18
other developing countries that had previously been exempted from complying with the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).1 The majority of subsidy programs to be
scrapped were fiscal incentives available to firms operating in special economic zones (SEZ) —
geographically-bounded areas in which customs, tax and investment regulations are more liberal
than in the rest of the country (Farole and Akinci, 2011). Although SEZ are not explicitly forbidden
by the WTO, firms operating in them are often subject to export share requirements (ESR) (Defever
and Rian˜o, 2016); that is, they are required to export at least a certain stated share of their output
in order to be eligible to receive the incentives available in SEZ.2 The imposition of ESR makes an
SEZ contingent upon export performance, thereby falling under the category of prohibited subsidies
under the ASCM.3
SEZ are pervasive across the world, and are one of the most important tools of industrial policy
in developing countries (Rodrik, 2004); Boyenge (2007) reports the existence of 3,500 (more recently,
The Economist (2015) puts this figure at 4,300) SEZ in 130 countries, accounting for approximately
US$ 200 billion worth of exports. These zones are crucially important for a small open economy like
the Dominican Republic, where exports originating from SEZ comprised 70% of aggregate exports
and 12% of GDP over the last decade, a period which was also characterized by a chronic trade
balance deficit, averaging 8.4% of GDP (Banco Central de la Repu´blica Dominicana, 2014).
Our objective in this paper is to investigate whether the removal of export share requirements
affected export performance in the special economic zones of the Dominican Republic. To do
so, we use transaction-level data covering the period 2006-2014, and exploit the fact that the
elimination of ESR took place in a staggered fashion over time and across different industries, in
order to identify the effect of this reform on the importance of exports originating from SEZ. To
1See: General Council decision of July 31, 2007 WT/L/691. The other beneficiaries of this extension were
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
and Uruguay. The notification also lists the subsidy programs that needed to be reformed.
2In fact, as Creskoff and Walkenhorst (2009) point out, they are not mentioned explicitly in any WTO agreement.
3Only least developed WTO members and countries whose per capita gross national product is below US$1,000
in 1990 dollars are currently exempt from the disciplines of the ASCM (Creskoff and Walkenhorst, 2009).
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be more precise, prior to 2007 all firms based in Dominican SEZ were subject to an 80% ESR —
i.e. they could sell at most 20% of their output in the Dominican customs territory. In May 2007,
law 56-07 first amended the regulatory framework for SEZ by declaring the textiles, clothing and
accessories, hides and skins, footwear, and leather articles sectors to be of ‘national priority’, based
on their importance in terms of exports and employment. The 2007 reform eliminated ESR for
SEZ firms in national priority sectors only, and at the same time extended some of the tariff and
tax incentives available to firms in SEZ to local producers outside the zones. In June 2011, law
139-11 fully eliminated ESR for all firms in SEZ regardless of their sector of operation. However,
and in contrast to the 2007 reform, the latter law did not extend any incentives to non-SEZ firms.
Our empirical analysis is underpinned by a model of subsidies with ESR in a heterogeneous-
firm environment proposed by Defever and Rian˜o (2016). Based on this theoretical framework we
develop a set of predictions regarding the consequences of eliminating ESR on firms’ extensive and
intensive margins of exports, as well as on the share of exports originating from SEZ (both in terms
of values and number of exporters) within narrowly-defined HS-6 products.
The model shows that ESR reduce the profitability of firms in SEZ which would have preferred
to sell a higher share of its sales in the domestic market than what the ESR allows — which we call
‘constrained exporters’. The model predicts that these firms would increase the prices they charge
abroad and thereby reduce export sales after the ESR is lifted. Conversely, firms that would have
chosen to export 80% or more of their output even in the absence of ESR — i.e. unconstrained
exporters — are unaffected by the reform. If, as it was the case in the Dominican Republic, the
reform of SEZ maintains the incentives available to firms based there, then the elimination of ESR
will make them more attractive locations for firms to be based. Since the latter goes in the opposite
direction as the effect of the ESR removal on the intensive margin of exports for existing constrained
exporters, the question of the importance of the response of SEZ exports to the policy change is,
ultimately, an empirical one.
Our results can be summarized as follows. In terms of the extensive margin, we find that
in line with the predictions delivered by our model, export entry among firms in SEZ increased
after the removal of ESR — particularly so after the second wave of reform, which targeted firms
producing non-priority goods. Moreover, we also find that the exit rate out of export markets
increased among non-SEZ firms in priority sectors, possibly due to more intense competition from
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firms operating in the zones. Moving on to the intensive margin of exports, we find that the value
of export transactions among SEZ firms fell following both waves of reform, as predicted by our
model. However, when restricting our analysis to the subset of firms that export in every year
throughout our period of study, we find that the change in the value of exports after the policy
change becomes statistically insignificant. This result suggests that continuing exporters do not
find the ESR constraint binding, whereas more sporadic exporters seem to have reallocated their
sales towards the domestic market once this alternative became feasible.
Examining the impact of the removal of ESR on the share of exports — both in terms of value
and number of exporting firms — at the product level paints a similar picture to that conveyed
by our analysis of export margins. We find that the removal of ESR increased the share of SEZ
exporters within HS-6 products by 5.4-7 percentage points relative to the situation in which per-
formance requirements were in place. At the same time, the share of export value accounted for by
SEZ does not change significantly after the reforms. As the requirements to operate in SEZ were
eased, more exporters chose to locate there; however, the bulk of export value originating from
SEZ seems to be accounted for by firms that were based there with the clear objective to export
the majority of their output, and were therefore not affected by the removal of ESR.
As noted above, the first wave of SEZ reforms implemented in 2007 sought to level the playing
field between SEZ and non-SEZ firms by lowering the tariffs imposed on key inputs utilized by
producers in priority sectors (firms in SEZ do not pay tariffs on intermediate inputs). Thus, with
a view to assess the effectiveness of this element of the Dominican reform strategy, we investigate
if the share of these liberalized products purchased by SEZ declined after 2007. Our conclusions
in this dimension are univocally negative; we do not find any substantial change in the share of
imports of these goods accounted for by SEZ after the trade liberalization. Thus, although a large
number of goods were made duty-free (126 HS-6 products), the ones that were primarily imported
by non-SEZ firms were, for the most part, general purpose rather than inputs specific to priority
sectors. This rendered the tariff cuts ineffective as an instrument to foster the expansion of firms
outside the zones in these sectors.
Taken altogether, our results suggest that the removal of ESR without eliminating the fiscal
incentives available to firms in SEZ has increased the attractiveness of operating in special economic
zones. Achieving a greater degree of compliance with the WTO disciplines on subsidies has not
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substantively reduced the Dominican Republic’s reliance on SEZ – if anything, the removal of ESR
has helped in cementing their importance in the country’s export basket, at least in the short-run.
Achieving compliance with WTO disciplines on subsidies poses a complex challenge for policy
makers in countries that rely intensively on exports originating from SEZ in the face of large and
chronic trade deficits. Opening up the domestic market to firms based in SEZ can result in unduly
intense competition for local firms given the tax advantages available in the zones. Curbing these
concessions, however, entails the risk that multinational firms would decide to relocate their oper-
ations to countries offering more generous incentive packages. Alternatively, equalizing incentives
inside and outside SEZ might not be feasible from a fiscal policy standpoint (FIAS, 2008; World
Bank, 2014). Thus, taking stock of the Dominican Republic’s experience with eliminating export
requirements can help to shed light on the future role of SEZ as an export promotion policy oper-
ating within a regulatory framework compatible with the WTO agreements.
Related Work. Export performance requirements have been studied from a theoretical perspec-
tive by Davidson et al. (1985), Rodrik (1987) and Chao and Yu (2014), with the aim of determining
under which circumstances these measures can improve welfare in countries enacting them. The
main conclusion arising from this body of work is that ESR can operate as second-best policies,
improving domestic welfare in the presence of pre-existing distortions.4 For instance, ESR can shift
rents towards the enacting country that would otherwise accrue to foreign-owned firms, or can also
lessen the overproduction distortion caused by tariffs imposed in import-competing sectors. More
recently, Defever and Rian˜o (2015, 2016), have studied how the use of subsidies with ESR affects
the intensity of competition and welfare using a quantitative model calibrated to evaluate the Chi-
nese experience with this class of incentives. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the
microeconomic effects of export share requirements on export performance. Moreover, evaluating
the consequences of ESR in the context of the reforms undertaken by the Dominican Republic
has the advantage — relative to the case of China studied by Defever and Rian˜o (2015, 2016) —
that the set of firms facing ESR are readily identifiable with our data and are only subject to one
4The theoretical literature on SEZ has also reached similar conclusions. See e.g. Hamada (1974), Young and
Miyagiwa (1987), Young (1991), Devereux and Chen (1995). Heid et al. (2013), on the other hand, show that an
expansion of export-oriented maquiladoras (i.e. firms exporting all their output) increases labor informality and lowers
aggregate welfare.
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such requirement.5 Additionally — and quite importantly — the fact that ESR were eliminated
in a staggered way across different sectors provides valuable variation across time and sectors that
allows us to identify the consequences of this policy change.
The Dominican Republic being one of the pioneers, and arguably, most successful exponents
of the use of SEZ in the Western Hemisphere, stands at the heart of a long-standing debate over
their desirability as an industrial policy to foster economic development (Volpe Martincus, 2010).
On the one hand, Kaplinsky (1993) argues that SEZ induced the Dominican Republic to specialize
in unskilled labor-intensive production, which due to declining terms-of-trade has resulted in im-
miserizing growth. Willmore (1995), on the contrary, argues that judged by its ability to promote
exports without threatening local producers, the Dominican SEZ program has been an unqualified
success. Sanchez-Ancochea (2006) and Schrank (2008) qualify this assertion and suggest that the
success of SEZ beyond export promotion hinges on the extent to which they have integrated with
the local economy — an argument formalized by Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1996). Our paper contributes
to this discussion by assessing how recent policy efforts aimed at promoting a new wave of SEZ
that goes beyond the low-skill-intensive enclaves of the past, have affected export outcomes —
arguably, one of the key performance dimensions for SEZ. Crucially, it does so by utilizing highly
detailed transaction-level micro data which allow us to elucidate the effect of the policy changes
while controlling for confounding factors that would contaminate the results obtained using only
aggregate data.
Our paper is related to work by Bagwell and Staiger (2006) studying the implications of GATT-
WTO rules on subsidies on economic outcomes, as well as to broader efforts to quantify the con-
sequences of eliminating “murky” forms of protectionism such as export subsidies, local content
requirements, and public procurement measures (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009; Evenett and Wer-
melinger, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in carrying out an empirical
assessment of whether policy reforms aimed at achieving compliance with WTO rules on subsi-
dies have affected trade outcomes. This is an issue of tremendous importance, since the inherent
difficulty in defining and measuring export subsidies, combined with a lack of comparable cross-
country data has resulted in fewer empirical studies investigating them than any other instrument
5In contrast, Defever and Rian˜o (2016) document a wide range of often overlapping policy measures subject to
different ESR thresholds in China.
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of commercial policy under the aegis of the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization,
2006). Our paper also contributes to a small, but flourishing empirical literature that investigates
the effect of SEZ and export processing regimes on exports (Ianchovichina, 2007; Fernandes and
Tang, 2012; Wang and Yu, 2012; Alder et al., 2013; Wang, 2013; Davies and Mazhikeyev, 2015;
Yu¨cer and Siroe¨n, 2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the regulations governing
SEZ in the Dominican Republic and the changes introduced by laws 56-07 and 139-11, which
mandated the elimination of ESR. Section 3 sketches a simple model of trade with heterogeneous
firms featuring subsidies subject to export share requirements and outlines predictions regarding
how the elimination of ESR would affect export performance at the firm and product level. Section
4 describes our data and provides a set of stylized facts characterizing export patterns in the
Dominican Republic, comparing firms in SEZ and those exporting through the national customs
regime as well as firms in national priority sectors and other industries. Section 5 discusses our
empirical strategy and presents our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Regulatory Changes in the Special Economic Zones of the
Dominican Republic
In this section we provide a brief summary of the incentives and performance requirements faced
by firms operating in SEZ in the Dominican Republic; we then discuss the reforms introduced by
laws 56-07 and 139-11 in 2007 and 2011 respectively.
Law 8-90 of January 1990 established the regulatory framework governing SEZ (Zonas Francas)
in the Dominican Republic. According to the law, its key objectives were to attract local and foreign
investment, provide training, and foment the transfer of technology and know-how in order to create
employment, particularly in economically deprived areas, such as the border with Haiti. Law 8-90
sought to encourage the expansion of SEZ by providing a generous array of fiscal incentives to
firms located there: these included duty-free access to imported inputs and capital goods, and a
15-year (20 years for firms located in border zones) 100% exemption of registration, construction,
gross sales and transfer of industrial goods taxes. In order to be eligible for these concessions, firms
operating in SEZ faced an 80% export share requirement (ESR), while firms located outside SEZ
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and exporting through the national customs regime were not subject to any performance obligations
regarding their export behavior. SEZ firms were also required to pay the corresponding full import
duty on the goods sold in the Dominican Republic.
Until 2007 the ESR applied equally to all SEZ firms regardless of their sector of operation as can
be seen in the first row of Table 1. Law 56-07 signed in May 2007 amended law 8-90 and declared
the textile, footwear and leather industries ‘national priority’ sectors. The law’s motivation noted
that worldwide structural change in the textile, footwear and apparel industries driven by China’s
increasing preponderance in the world economy and changes in WTO agreements such as end of
the MFA agreement have eroded the competitiveness of these sectors in the Dominican Republic.
Due to their importance in terms of job creation, the law sought to provide support to producers
in these industries in the face of adverse external circumstances. Besides this objective, law 56-07
also aimed at fostering the convergence between SEZ and non-SEZ firms in view of the country’s
agreement to eliminate performance requirements under the CAFTA-DR trade agreement and the
ASCM. This constituted a gradual first step forward towards the SEZ regime achieving compliance
with the ASCM— following on the footsteps of China, Vietnam, Mauritius and Costa Rica (Waters,
2013; World Bank, 2014).
Table 1: Changes in SEZ Regulations in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2014
Period National Priority Sectors Non-priority Sectors
2006-07
2008-11
ESR fully removed; duty-free access to 
domestic market
80% ESR remains; duty-free access on domestic 
sales if product is not produced in DR or has at 
least 25% of local input content
2012-14
Domestic sales remain free of import duties but 
are subject to a 3.5% tax on gross sales and 
18% VAT
ESR fully removed; Domestic sales are subject to 
import duty, 3.5% tax on gross sales and 18% 
VAT
2006-07
2008-11
Duty-free access to 126 'priority' intermediate 
inputs; exemption of  tax on transfer of 
industrial goods (ITBIS)
No change
2012-14
S
E
Z
 f
ir
m
s
N
o
n
-S
E
Z
 f
ir
m
s
80% ESR; duty-free imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods; full exemption of gross 
sales, registration, construction and transfer of industrial goods (ITBIS) taxes for 15 years (20 
years for firms in border SEZ)
No ESR; subject to national customs regime
No change
Source: Law 56-07 (available in Spanish at https://www.dgii.gov.do/legislacion/leyesTributarias/Documents/
56-07.pdf) and law 139-11 (available in Spanish at https://www.dgii.gov.do/legislacion/leyesTributarias/
Documents/139-11.pdf).
7
The second and fifth rows of Table 1 outline the main policy changes brought about by law
56-07 for SEZ and non-SEZ firms in priority and non-priority sectors. SEZ firms in priority sectors
saw the full removal of ESR, which meant that they could now sell all their output in the Dominican
Republic if they wished to do so; moreover, these domestic sales were not subject to import duties.
Priority-sector firms operating outside SEZ received tax concessions similar to those available to
their SEZ counterparts and enjoyed duty-free access to 126 HS-6 key imported inputs.
The 2007 reform maintained the 80% ESR for SEZ firms producing non-priority goods but
offered them duty-free access to the domestic market provided that either the good in question was
not produced in the Dominican Republic or, that it incorporated at least 25% of locally-sourced
intermediate inputs in value terms. Tax concessions available to SEZ firms in both priority and
non-priority sectors did not change with this reform. Firms producing non-priority goods and
located outside SEZ were not directly affected by law 56-07.
Law 139-11 (June 2011) completely eliminated export share requirements for all SEZ firms
regardless of their sector of operation in accordance to the compromises signed under the CAFTA-
DR free trade agreement. SEZ firms in priority sectors retain their duty-free access to the Dominican
market whereas their non-priority counterparts need to pay the customary import tariffs mandated
by the national customs regime. All SEZ firms are required to pay a 3.5% gross sales tax and 18%
VAT on their domestic sales (see row 3 of Table 1), while non-SEZ firms were not directly affected
by this law.
3 How Does Eliminating Export Share Requirements Affect Ex-
port Performance?
In order to understand how the elimination of export share requirements for firms in special eco-
nomic zones affects export performance, we use a theoretical framework developed by Defever and
Rian˜o (2016), which is in turn based on the workhorse Melitz (2003) model of international trade
with heterogeneous firms, to guide our empirical analysis. However, since our focus lies on indi-
vidual firm and product-level effects of the policy change, we abstract from general equilibrium
considerations.
To fix ideas, consider an environment with two countries, Home (H), which we take to be the
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Dominican Republic, and Foreign (F ), which represents the rest of the world. There is a continuum
of firms operating at Home, each of which produces a unique differentiated good ω using labor as the
sole input. We assume, for simplicity, that all firms are homogenous in terms of their productivity,
which implies that all producers have a constant marginal cost, c.6 The demand function faced by
a firm selling product ω in market i P tH,F ✉, is:
qi♣ωq ✏ Ai♣ωqpi♣ωq
✁σ, (1)
where σ → 1 denotes the elasticity of demand and pi♣ωq is the price charged by firm ω in market
i.7 The term Ai♣ωq encompasses both aggregate variables such as a country’s GDP and price level
— both of which are common across all producers — as well as product appeal factors that are
firm-destination-specific. Including the latter is necessary to produce a non-degenerate distribution
of export intensity. As discussed below, this implies that some firms will export the majority of
their output even without export share requirements.
We assume that firms can sell domestically without incurring any additional cost, but face
a fixed cost fx and an iceberg transport cost τ ➙ 1 if they export. Crucially, firms can choose
to sell their output abroad either through the national customs regime or via a special economic
zone. Non-SEZ firms are free to sell however much they want domestically but do not receive any
incentives. On the other hand, firms located in SEZ stand to receive a subsidy sr on their sales
or marginal costs (e.g. duty-free access to imported inputs, corporate income tax exemptions or
lower utility rates) and/or a subsidy sf on their fixed costs (e.g. lower registration costs or access
to better port infrastructure) provided they export more than a fraction η of their sales, which
prior to 2007 would have been set at 0.8 for all firms in Dominican SEZ. We explain the profit
maximization problem of firms operating in these two regimes below.
All firms sell some of their output domestically. As it is well known, given the demand function
(1), firms set a price at Home, pH♣ωq ✏
σc
σ✁1 , which is a constant mark up above their marginal cost,
thus generating domestic sales rH♣ωq ✏
 
σ✁1
σc
✟σ✁1
AH♣ωq, which are increasing in the domestic de-
6Assuming instead that firms differ in terms of productivity, as is standard in the literature, does not alter
the conclusions of the analysis that follows. This is the case because firm-level export intensity is independent of
productivity when demand functions are iso-elastic.
7Such a demand function would obtain if individuals have love-for-variety Dixit-Stiglitz utility functions as in
Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003).
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mand shifter. Domestic profits are in turn given by πH♣ωq ✏ κAH♣ωq, where κ ✑ ♣σ✁1q
σ✁1σ✁σc1✁σ.
Let us now consider the problem of an exporter selling its output through the national customs
regime. Since the marginal cost of production is constant, this firm will choose to export if the profit
from selling abroad exceeds the fixed cost fx; otherwise it would prefer to only sell domestically.
A non-SEZ exporter sets price pF ♣ωq ✏ τpH♣ωq in the foreign market; its export sales are given
by rF ♣ωq ✏ τ
1✁σ
 
σ✁1
σc
✟σ✁1
AF ♣ωq, and export profits are πF ♣ωq ✏ κτ
1✁σAF ♣ωq ✁ fx. It follows
that only firms with sufficiently high foreign demand appeal choose to export; that is, those for
which AF ♣ωq ➙ A
✝
F ✏ ♣fx④κqτ
σ✁1. Total profits for non-SEZ exporters are therefore given by
π♣ωq ✏ κ
 
AH♣ωq   τ
1✁σAF ♣ωq
✟
✁ fx.
Define the ‘natural’ export intensity of an exporter, η♣ωq, as the share of its total sales accounted
for by exports in the absence of subsidies or ESR:
η♣ωq ✑
rF ♣ωq
rH♣ωq   rF ♣ωq
✏
τ1✁σAF ♣ωq
AH♣ωq   τ1✁σAF ♣ωq
. (2)
It is straightforward to show that any deviations from (2) would reduce firms’ profits by distorting
the necessary condition that marginal revenue has to be equalized across markets. As (2) makes
clear, firms can operate at very high export intensities in the absence of ESR, for instance, if they
conduct assembly operations as a link in a global value chain, if they produce highly sophisticated
products with little domestic demand (medical instruments would be a relevant example for the
Dominican Republic) or have built an extensive network of foreign customers.8
The profit maximization problem of a firm located in the SEZ facing an ESR η P ♣0, 1s and
receiving subsidies ♣sr, sf q is:
max
pz
H
♣ωq,pz
F
♣ωq
★
♣1 srq
✑
AH♣ωq ♣p
z
H♣ωqq
1✁σ  AF ♣ωq ♣p
z
F ♣ωqq
1✁σ
✙
✁c
✏
AH♣ωq ♣p
z
H♣ωqq
✁σ   τAF ♣ωq ♣p
z
F ♣ωqq
✁σ✘
✁ ♣1✁ sf qfx
✰
subject to:
AF ♣ωq ♣p
z
F ♣ωqq
1✁σ
AH♣ωq
 
pzH♣ωq
✟
1✁σ
 AF ♣ωq
 
pzF ♣ωq
✟
1✁σ ➙ η, (3)
where the superscript z indexes variables for firms based in SEZ. Defever and Rian˜o (2016) show
that the solution to problem (3) involves two types of firms operating in SEZ, which we denote
8If fixed costs associated with selling domestically were included in the model, then ‘pure exporters’, i.e. firms
selling all their output abroad, would arise when domestic profits are not sufficiently high to cover the domestic fixed
cost.
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unconstrained and constrained exporters.
Unconstrained exporters are those that do not find the ESR constraint binding; i.e. firms
with natural export intensity of at least η. These firms do not need to distort their allocation
of sales across domestic and foreign markets to receive the subsidies available in SEZ. Thus,
they charge prices pzH♣ωq ✏
1
1 sr
σc
σ✁1 and p
z
F ♣ωq ✏ τp
z
H♣ωq and realize total profits π
z♣ωq ✏
♣1   srq
σκ
 
AH♣ωq   τ
1✁σAF ♣ωq
✟
✁ ♣1 ✁ sf qfx. For unconstrained exporters in SEZ any incen-
tive conditioned on ESR operates in the same way as a standard unconditional production subsidy.
This means that they charge lower prices, both domestically and abroad, and earn higher profits
than in the absence of subsidies, while still operating at their natural export intensity.
Constrained exporters, on the other hand, are firms with natural export intensity strictly below
the ESR threshold, but that nevertheless choose to alter their export intensity in order to be eligible
to operate in the SEZ and receive the subsidies available there. These firms curtail domestic sales, by
increasing prices at Home while at the same time increasing export sales until they reach an export
intensity exactly equal to η (see Defever and Rian˜o, 2016, Proposition 1). Therefore, constrained
exporters in SEZ set prices,
pzH♣ωq ✏
✓
♣1✁ ηq
σ
σ✁1AF ♣ωq
1
σ✁1   η
σ
σ✁1 τAH♣ωq
1
σ✁1
♣1✁ ηq
1
σ✁1AF ♣ωq
1
σ✁1
✛
1
1  sr
σc
σ ✁ 1
, (4)
pzF ♣ωq ✏
✓
♣1✁ ηq
σ
σ✁1AF ♣ωq
1
σ✁1   η
σ
σ✁1 τAH♣ωq
1
σ✁1
η
1
σ✁1AH♣ωq
1
σ✁1
✛
1
1  sr
σc
σ ✁ 1
, (5)
which result in profits:
πz♣ωq ✏ κ♣1  srq
σΘ
 
AH♣ωq, AF ♣ωq, η, τ
✟
✁ ♣1✁ sf qfx, (6)
where Θ, is defined as:
Θ ✑
AH♣ωqAF ♣ωq✑
♣1✁ ηq
σ
σ✁1AF ♣ωq
1
σ✁1   η
σ
σ✁1 τAH♣ωq
1
σ✁1
✙σ✁1 . (7)
The profit shifter term Θ is strictly concave in η reaching a global maximum at a firm’s natural
export intensity, η♣ωq. Thus, firms with relatively high natural export intensity — yet lower than
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the ESR threshold — are more likely to operate as constrained exporters in SEZ.
Based on the characterization of optimal firm behavior above, we can establish a set of pre-
dictions delivered by the model in response to the reforms introduced by laws 56-07 and 139-11.
These predictions are based on a comparative static exercise which entails a marginal reduction
in the ESR threshold η.9 We first note that unconstrained SEZ exporters would not modify their
pricing or sales choices if the ESR constraint was relaxed, since they are already operating at their
natural export intensity. Constrained SEZ exporters would, however, seize the opportunity to in-
crease their domestic sales, and would do so by redirecting some of their output to be sold at Home.
Thus, constrained exporters would simultaneously lower domestic prices and increase export prices,
thereby either achieving their natural export intensity, or, at the very least, operating at the newer
lower ESR threshold.
Prediction 1 Relaxing the ESR constraint (i.e. a reduction in η), everything else equal, would
induce constrained SEZ exporters to lower domestic prices and increase export prices. This in
turn implies an increase in domestic sales and a reduction in export sales for this group of firms.
Unconstrained exporters do not change their prices nor their sales in either market in response to
the policy change.
Lowering the ESR threshold increases the profitability of being based in SEZ for constrained
exporters if the incentives available to SEZ firms are maintained after the reform — as laws 56-07
and 139-11 did — thereby making SEZ more attractive locations for firms to operate from. This
yields our second prediction,
Prediction 2 Relaxing the ESR constraint, everything else equal, would induce some firms export-
ing through the national customs regime to operate in SEZ.
Taking Predictions 1 and 2 together implies an ambiguous response of exports originating from
SEZ to a relaxation of the ESR constraint. On the one hand, export sales of constrained exporters
9A full elimination of the ESR while maintaining the incentives to SEZ in the model would imply that all firms
would prefer to operate in SEZ. This would not happen in reality because there is a limited supply of locations in
industrial parks in which SEZ are established and also because firms that wish to operate in SEZ need gain the
approval of the Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas de Exportacio´n, a public-private body that regulates SEZ. In
the context of the model, a fixed cost associated with changing a firm’s status from the national customs regime to
SEZ would prevent an equilibrium in which all firms choose to operate in SEZ; following this route would leave our
conclusions unchanged.
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fall in response to a reduction in η. On the other hand, new entry into SEZ would increase total
export sales from SEZ. The combination of these two effects, therefore, yields our third prediction:
Prediction 3 A relaxation of the ESR, everything else equal, has an ambiguous effect on the value
of exports originating from SEZ.
The magnitude of the overall effect depends on the relative importance of constrained exporters
operating in SEZ vis-a`-vis unconstrained exporters, as well as on the share of non-SEZ exporters
that would find profitable to switch to SEZ after the ESR is relaxed, a feature that depends crucially
on the distribution of demand shifters Ai♣ωq across firms. In the remainder of the paper we set out
to investigate whether the predictions delivered by our model bear out in the data.
4 Data and Stylized Facts
In this section we first describe the data used in the paper and provide summary statistics illus-
trating the broad export and import patterns observed over our period of analysis. We next shift
focus towards documenting the importance of SEZ and national priority sectors in the Dominican
Republic’s export basket and examine whether there are any discernable changes in export perfor-
mance, at least at the aggregate level, following the reforms implemented in 2007 and 2011. We
conclude by exploring the extent to which the tariff concessions mandated by law 56-07 affected
priority-sector firms outside the SEZ.
Our study exploits detailed firm-level customs data provided by the Dominican Republic Cus-
toms Agency (Direccio´n General de Aduanas, DGA). The data contains all export and import
transaction values by product at the HS 6-digit level and by origin/destination for the period 2006-
2014. Throughout this period, the universe of firms consists of 29,682 firms reporting at least
one positive export transaction in at least one of 4,466 HS-6 digit products to at least one of 230
customs territories. Crucially, our data identifies trade flows that originate or reach firms located
in SEZ.
The Dominican Republic is one of the world’s pioneers in the use of SEZ with a program
ongoing for more than 40 years (Burgaud and Farole, 2011). Figure 1 shows that SEZ exports
account for more than half of aggregate export value throughout our period of interest — although
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their importance has dwindled both in terms of value and number of exporters.10 Conversely, SEZ
firms comprise a substantially smaller share of the country’s imports and constitute less than 2%
of all importing firms. This striking difference underscores the significance of the SEZ regime at
the macroeconomic level for the Dominican Republic — the foreign exchange earnings generated
by SEZ exports plays a key role in enabling the import flows required by the rest of the economy.
Figure 1: Importance of SEZ on Export and Import Transactions, 2006-2014
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA.
Zooming in into firm-level export and import performance, Table 2 shows that SEZ firms differ
substantially from firms trading through the national customs regime. SEZ firms are larger in terms
of the value of their export and import transactions, export and import more products, sell to more
destination markets and acquire imported inputs from a wider range of countries than non-SEZ
firms. These differences remain when we compare median performance outcomes, which help to
ensure that the results are not driven by outliers. These figures are in line with those reported by
Fernandes et al. (2016) for countries at a similar stage of development.
10Schrank (2008) reports that the share of aggregate exports accounted for by SEZ exceeded 80% in the early 2000s
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Table 2: Importance of SEZ on Export and Import Transactions, 2006-2014
Special Economic Zones National Customs Regime
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Transaction value per firm Mean 44.98 54.05 5.62 3.32
Median 0.27 4.99 0.05 0.04
Products per firm Mean 6.38 46.32 4.03 9.91
Median 1.00 20.00 1.00 2.00
Destinations/origins per firm Mean 2.58 4.82 1.61 1.47
Median 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Export and import transaction
values are denominated in hundreds of thousands US Dollars. Figures are averaged across the period 2006-2014.
Export Performance across SEZ and National Priority Status. We now provide a first look
at aggregate export performance according to firms’ SEZ status and whether they operate or not
in national priority sectors, which experienced an earlier removal of ESR. Following the discussion
in Section 2 regarding the reforms of the SEZ regime in the Dominican Republic, we consider three
periods of analysis: pre-reform (2006-07), introduction of national priority sectors (2008-12) and
full ESR elimination reform (2012-14).
Figure 2: Export Performance across SEZ and National Priority Status
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA.
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Figure 2 shows very minor change in total export sales between 2006-07 and 2008-12, both
for priority and non-priority sectors and SEZ and non-SEZ firms. This stability of course masks
a significant fall in exports during the global financial crisis in 2008-09, which was subsequently
followed by a rapid recovery in 2010. The textiles and apparel, leather and footwear industries
accounted for approximately one-fifth of the Dominican Republic’s aggregate exports, almost all of
which originated from SEZ throughout our period of study. The importance of national priority
products in the Dominican export basket has declined secularly since 2000, both because of the
erosion of trade preferences and more intense competition by low-wage producers at the regional
(e.g. Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua) and global level (e.g. Bangladesh, China and Vietnam). These
two channels have resulted in Dominican exporters experiencing substantial market share losses,
particularly in the US market. Non-SEZ firms account for a larger share of export value in non-
priority sectors, with their importance increasing over time — a pattern consistent with a long-term
trend of greater export dynamism for firms operating outside SEZ identified by Burgaud and Farole
(2011) and World Bank (2014).
At first pass, the elimination of the ESR for SEZ firms and the extension of fiscal incentives
to non-SEZ firms in priority sectors mandated by law 56-07 does not appear to have had a strong
impact on aggregate export flows in national priority sectors. SEZ firms still account for the
overwhelming majority of priority sector exports in terms of value, with the share of non-SEZ
exports increasing by only 1 percentage point, from 1.5 to 2.5%, after the 2007 reform. Extending
the fiscal incentives available on SEZ to firms exporting through the national customs regime does
not appear to have reoriented exports away from SEZ in priority sectors.
The fall in the share of aggregate exports originating in SEZ presented in Figure 1, however,
understates their continuing preponderance in the Dominican Republic’s international trade. Table
3 presents the top 20 HS-2 export products during our sample period, as well as the number of
exporting firms and the share of exports originating in SEZ. For only one out of the top-10 exported
products is the average share of SEZ exports below 40%, and in fact, for 7 out of 10 broadly defined
sectors, this share exceeds 90%. Thus, even though the export portfolio of the Dominican Republic
has gradually diversified over the last decade (World Bank, 2014), its main comparative advantage
sectors are still highly reliant on SEZ.
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Table 3: Top-20 Export Products, 2006-2014
HS-2 Sector Export # % Exported
Value Firms from SEZ
Optical and medical instruments 690.33 368.00 96
Precious metals and jewelry 615.27 390.22 42
Electrical machinery and equipment 539.83 492.11 94
Iron and steel 526.37 150.22 5
Tobacco 450.96 233.56 95
Apparel and clothing 396.13 336.67 99
Plastics 263.41 591.33 61
Cotton 263.32 88.56 99
Knitted goods 251.70 266.22 99
Footwear 225.77 114.67 98
Tin articles 178.14 567.67 8
Pharmaceutical products 154.50 177.89 89
Cocoa 153.88 80.00 39
Sugar confectionaries 132.10 100.67 5
Beverages 125.33 161.22 9
Paper 113.84 300.11 78
Mineral fuels 108.34 68.00 2
Misc. edible preparations 87.15 134.00 43
Salt, earth and cement 85.30 115.22 1
Nuclear reactors and related machinery 83.50 617.78 63
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Export
and import transaction values are denominated in millions of US Dollars. Figures are
averaged across the period 2006-2014. Shaded rows indicate national priority sectors.
Although both Figure 2 and Table 3 clearly illustrate the fact that SEZ account for the lion’s
share of exports in national priority sectors, Table 4 shows that there is still substantial hetero-
geneity — both in terms of export performance and the importance of SEZ — across individual
products. In terms of export values, SEZ account for the majority of exports across priority prod-
ucts, with the exception of special yarns and carpets (HS 56 and 57 respectively) — both of which
have quite low export sales. The number of non-SEZ firms is also more important in low export
value products, such as leather goods, yarns and crocheted fibres (HS 42, 56 and 60 respectively).
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Table 4: Exports of National Priority Sectors
Special Economic Zones National Customs Regime
Sector HS 2 Export # % Export # %
code Value Firms Exports Value Firms Exports
Leather 41 11.49 14.44 66 5.83 29.33 34
goods 42 10.03 47.78 93 0.79 74.89 7
43 0.02 1.57 60 0.01 1.80 40
50 0.47 2.89 88 0.06 5.56 12
51 0.41 7.89 80 0.10 3.89 20
52 261.07 60.56 99 2.25 28.00 1
53 0.12 6.00 63 0.07 5.11 37
54 3.09 17.63 94 0.19 8.78 6
Textiles 55 4.17 42.67 96 0.16 15.89 4
and 56 0.53 12.78 32 1.12 36.56 68
textile 57 0.02 2.67 35 0.04 10.11 65
articles 58 6.67 51.44 92 0.57 36.89 8
59 0.52 8.11 96 0.02 9.89 4
60 7.29 21.11 65 3.87 139.89 35
61 249.14 151.33 99 2.56 114.89 1
62 392.28 188.67 99 3.86 148 1
63 42.54 73.33 90 4.54 163.33 10
Footwear 64 221.12 37.33 98 4.65 77.33 2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Export and import
transaction values are denominated in millions of US Dollars. Figures are averaged across the period
2006-2014.
Law 56-07 also provided duty-free access for 126 imported inputs to firms in national priority
sectors operating outside SEZ. Table 5 presents the top 20 HS-6 liberalized inputs in terms of
import value as well as the share of value imported destined to SEZ and the percentage of imports
purchased by national priority exporters outside SEZ. This table suggests that the reduction in
tariffs mandated by law 56-07 was likely to have a minor impact on non-SEZ firms in priority
sectors, given that the most important inputs liberalized were almost exclusively imported by SEZ
firms — which could already purchase these products duty-free. The last column of Table 5 also
shows that the majority of import value of products that are primarily purchased by non-SEZ
firms (with the exception of ammonium sulphate) is accounted for by exporters selling products
other than textiles, leather and apparel. Thus, it seems that the liberalized products were either
mostly imported by SEZ firms, or were general-purpose rather than inputs specific to priority sector
producers.
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Table 5: Top 20 HS-6 ‘Priority Input’ Imports
HS-6 Product HS6 code Import % SEZ % of non-SEZ
Value Imports Imports used in
Priority Sectors
White spirit 271011 1437.24 1 4
Plastic articles nes 392690 278.8 90 2
Soles and heels for footwear of rubber or plastic 640620 22.71 96 2
Bovine leather, vegetable pre-tanned 410411 18.1 99 0
Cartons, boxes & cases, of corrugated paper 481910 16.12 78 2
Other bovine leather, vegetable pre-tanned 410449 14.26 98 1
Footwear uppers and parts thereof, except stiffeners 640610 12.64 99 0
Ammonium sulphate 310221 12.4 0 52
Pigments and preparations based on titanium dioxide 320611 11.63 2 15
Cotton sewing thread for retail 520420 11.56 99 1
Pesticides, rodenticides 380892 11.4 1 23
Composition leather, in slabs, sheets or strip 411510 11.27 99 1
Parts of footwear nes, gaiters and leggings 640699 10.05 99 0
Cartons, boxes & cases, folding, non-corrugated paper 481920 7.55 65 6
Sheet etc, cellular of polyurethane 392113 7.52 85 7
Finishing agents, dye carriers, dressing, mordants 380991 7.18 81 1
Knitted non-pile fabrics 600330 7.03 94 1
Chemical products and preparations 382490 6.93 10 17
Goat or kid skin leather 410622 6.9 95 2
Buckles and clasps 830890 6.71 83 3
Chemical colouring matter 320416 5.79 98 0
Adhesives based on rubber 350691 5.61 38 12
Cotton sewing thread (↕ 85%) 520419 5.44 86 11
Tulles and other net fabric 580410 5.24 98 0
Made up articles of textile material 630790 5.2 57 9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Import values are denominated in
millions of US Dollars. Figures are averaged across the period 2006-2014. Shaded rows indicate HS-6 products that
are primarily imported by non-SEZ firms.
5 Empirical Analysis and Results
Our main objective in this paper is to determine whether the removal of export share requirements
in SEZ, first in national priority sectors and subsequently across all other industries, affected the
prevalence of SEZ in the exports of the Dominican Republic. We will also evaluate whether the
input tariff reduction experienced by non-SEZ firms in priority sectors had an impact on the import
behavior of these firms.
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Our identication strategy relies on the comparison between priority and non-priority sectors,
which experienced the removal of ESR at different points in time. We first describe the construc-
tion of our key explanatory variables related to the removal of the ESR for firms in SEZ, which
occurred in July 2007 (law 56-07) and June 2011 (law 139-11). As we noted in Section 4 above,
we can consider three distinctive periods in our analysis: 2006-2007, when the ESR is in place for
SEZ firms in both priority and non-priority sectors, 2008-2011, when the ESR was lifted only for
SEZ firms operating in priority sectors and, 2012-2014, when the ESR had been removed for all
firms based in the zones regardless of their sector of operation. Since is likely that firms required
some time to adapt their behavior to changes stipulated in the two laws, we aggregate the data
at a yearly frequency and consider the impact of the first and second regulatory changes starting
from the beginning of 2008 and 2012 respectively. Thus, we define the variable POST08t as taking
the value 1 from 2008 onwards and 0 otherwise, and likewise, POST12t is a dummy variable that
turns on from 2012 onwards.
Did the removal of ESR affect the Extensive and Intensive Margin of Exports at the
Firm-level? We first investigate if the elimination of export performance requirements affected the
export entry and exit behavior of firms within HS-6 products over time, i.e. the extensive margin
of exports. Our identication strategy relies on the comparison between priority and non-priority
sectors and the different time in which they were subject to the elimination of ESR. We aggregate
our data at the firm-product-location-year level, with products being defined at the HS-6 digit level
and location indicates whether a firm is located or not in an SEZ. We then estimate the impact of
the two waves of reform separately for firms located in SEZ and outside them. Our OLS estimating
equation for the extensive margin of exports is therefore given by:
Entry/Exitijℓt ✏ β1♣Post08t ✝ Priorityj ✝ SEZℓq   β2♣Post08t ✝ Priorityj ✝ non-SEZℓq 
β3♣Post12t ✝Non-Priorityj ✝SEZℓq β4♣Post12t ✝Non-Priorityj ✝non-SEZℓq fjℓ fℓt Tj˜t εijℓt,
(8)
where i indexes firms, j, HS-6 products, ℓ, locations, and t, years. Entryijℓt is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if a firm-product-location combination reports a positive export value at time
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t but not in the previous year. Similarly, Exitijℓt takes the value 1 if a firm-product-location exports
in year t but does not report any export sales in year t   1. As noted above, SEZℓ is a dummy
that takes value 1 if a firm is located in a special economic zone and 0 otherwise, while non-SEZℓ
is the opposite image. Tj˜t is an HS-2-product-specific linear trend which intends to control for
broadly-defined time-varying sectoral supply and demand shifts. We estimate the effect of policy
changes within and outside the zone independently. To this end, the set of HS-6 digit product fixed
effects fjℓ and year fixed effects fℓt, are set to be specific to location ℓ. Including this battery of
location-specific fixed effects allows for differential average effects on export performance according
to firms’ SEZ status as well as controlling for time-varying differences within and outside the zones.
The standard errors in regressions (8) and (9) below are clustered at the HS-6 product level.
Table 6 presents our findings regarding the effect of laws 56-07 and 139-11 on the extensive
margin of exports for firms according to their SEZ and national priority status. Prediction 2
suggests that inasmuch as the removal of ESR induces more firms to locate in SEZ, we should expect
a positive effect on export entry among firms located in SEZ. At the same time, firms’ relocation
towards SEZ might also increase the exit rate among firms exporting through the national customs
regime. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 provide support for this hypothesis.
Export entry increased for SEZ firms in both priority and non-priority sectors after the removal
of the ESR constraint — although the effect is statistically significant only for SEZ producers in
non-priority sectors. The entry rate into exporting for these firms increased by 10 percentage points
following the reform implemented in 2011. We also observe an increase in the exit rate of firms
exporting through the national customs regime in priority sectors after 2008 (column 2). This is
expected as eliminating the export requirement would intensify the competition faced by non-SEZ
firms. Nevertheless, it is somewhat puzzling to observe this response following the 2007 reform, since
the government extended some of the tax incentives available in SEZ to priority sector producers
outside the zones; in contrast, law 139-11 did not provide any incentives to non-SEZ firms. As we
discuss in more detail below when we investigate the input tariff reduction mandated by law 56-07,
this dimension of the SEZ reform was largely ineffective in providing incentives to firms outside
SEZ.
We next investigate the response of the intensive margin of exports. More specifically, we
explore how the export value of firms operating in a given location, selling a given HS-6 product,
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was affected by the elimination of ESR for each of the four types of firms considered in our analysis
of the extensive margin above. Equation (9) presents our OLS estimating equation for the intensive
margin, where the dependent variable is the log of export value by firm i exporting HS-6 product
j from location ℓ in year t, and all other variables have been defined above:
lnYijℓt ✏ β1♣Post08t✝Priorityj✝SEZℓq β2♣Post08t✝Priorityj✝non-SEZℓq β3♣Post12t✝Non-Priorityj✝SEZℓq
  β4♣Post12t ✝Non-Priorityj ✝ non-SEZℓq   fijℓ   fℓt   Tj˜t   εijℓt. (9)
The results reported in column (3) of table 6 show that firms operating in SEZ experienced a
reduction in the value of individual export transactions at the HS-6 product level after ESR were
eliminated, with the magnitude of the effect being quite similar for SEZ firms independently of their
sector of operation. Firms exporting through the national customs regime were, on the other hand,
largely unaffected along this margin. This result is consistent with Prediction 1 from our model.
After the limit on domestic sales was lifted, constrained exporters increase export prices lowering
exports sales. However, this average effect encompasses both the change in behavior of constrained
exporters, which were previously forced to export 80% of their output, as well as unconstrained
exporters, which would have been unaffected by the elimination of the export requirement. In order
to disentangle these two different responses, we re-estimate regression (9) on the set of continuing
exporters, i.e. those firms that have conducted export transactions in every year of our sample.11
We do so with the view that perennial exporters are more likely to be unconstrained (Be´ke´s and
Murako¨zy, 2012).12 The results reported in column (4) show that although the negative effect of the
removal of ESR on the intensive margin of exports for SEZ firms remains, it becomes statistically
insignificant as we expected. Lastly, we do not find any evidence that the removal of ESR had any
discernable effect on the size of export transactions sold by non-SEZ exporters.
11Notice that since we do not observe the value of firms’ domestic sales, we cannot directly distinguish constrained
and unconstrained exporters in SEZ.
12Interviews with managers at several firms in SEZ carried out in December 2015, reveal that large foreign-owned
firms that export permanently sell almost all their output abroad, perhaps with the exception of defective orders
that are sometimes sold locally. Interestingly, some of these large multinationals even choose to serve the Dominican
market via affiliates located in other CAFTA-DR country members, since by doing so they avoid paying import tariffs
that they would otherwise face if they were to sell directly from their SEZ plant.
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Table 6: Response of Firm-level Intensive and Extensive Margins of Exports to the Removal of
ESR
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Entry Exit Value Value
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Post08t ✝ Priorityj ✝ SEZℓ 0.035 -0.024 -0.234** -0.146
(0.025) (0.020) (0.102) (0.361)
Post08t ✝ Priorityj ✝ non-SEZℓ 0.010 0.040** 0.106 0.579
(0.021) (0.026) (0.108) (0.824)
Post12t ✝Non-Priorityj ✝ SEZℓ 0.097*** -0.039 -0.218** -0.148
(0.021) (0.026) (0.098) (0.286)
Post12t ✝Non-Priorityj ✝ non-SEZℓ 0.002 -0.016 0.183 -0.331
(0.019) (0.022) (0.151) (0.440)
Observations 188,623 170,991 203,137 3,672
R2 0.047 0.019 0.010 0.090
***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
All regressions are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at the HS-6 product
level. Specifications [1] and [2] include HS-6 product ✂ location and year ✂ location fixed
effects, as well as HS-2 product-specific linear trends. Specifications [3] and [4] include firm ✂
HS-6 product ✂ location, year ✂ location fixed effects and HS-2 product-specific linear trends.
Column [3] includes all firms, whereas the regression reported in column [4] is restricted to
only include firms that have conducted export transactions in a given HS-6 product in every
year of our sample.
Did the elimination of ESR affect the importance of exports originating from SEZ?We
now present our main conclusion concerning the change in the importance of exports originating
from SEZ after the elimination of ESR. As we discussed in Section 3, if the constraint on domestic
sales is lifted for SEZ firms and the level of fiscal incentives available in the zones remains unchanged,
we would expect that more firms find profitable to be based in SEZ, and this in turn should increase
the share of SEZ exports for a given HS-6 product (Prediction 2). On the other hand, if a substantial
number of firms in SEZ were constrained by the 80% ESR, we would expect that the elimination of
ESR would induce these producers to reallocate some of their sales towards the domestic market,
thereby reducing the importance of exports originating from the SEZ (Prediction 1). Therefore,
Prediction 3 tells us that, overall, the SEZ reform is expected to have an ambiguous effect on the
share of SEZ exports.
We now aggregate our data at the HS-6 product-year level and use as our dependent variable
the shares of export value originating from SEZ and the number of exporters located in SEZ in a
given HS-6 product. We are interested in gauging the effect that the 2007 and 2011 reforms had in
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products belonging to priority and non-priority sectors. Thus, we focus in the coefficients β1 and
β2 in the following OLS regression equation:
ShrSEZjt ✏ β1♣Post08t ✝ Priorityjq   β2♣Post12t ✝Non-Priorityjq   fj   ft   Tj˜t   εjt, (10)
where j indexes HS-6 products and t indexes years as before; fj and ft denote product and year
fixed effects respectively. This set of fixed effects and product trends control both for time-invariant
characteristics that affect the attractiveness of exporting a particular product from SEZ, as well as
for time-varying secular changes at the sectoral level, which could confound the interpretation of
the difference-in-differences coefficients. As in our previous regressions, robust standard errors in
regression (10) are clustered at the HS-6 product level.
Table 7 presents our estimates of regression (10). Our results confirm the initial impression
provided by Table 6 and are also consistent with Predictions 2 and 3 of our model. The share
of exports accounted for by SEZ did not change significantly after the reforms. Conversely, we
find that scrapping the ESR had a positive and significant effect on the share of exporting firms
operating in SEZ. More precisely, the share of firms in priority sectors exporting through SEZ
increased by 7 percentage points on average relative to the situation with ESR, while law 139-11
led to an increase of 5.4 percentage points in the share of SEZ exporters in non-priority sectors.
The fact that the increase in the share of SEZ exporters is slightly higher in priority sectors suggests
that the efforts to extend the incentives available in SEZ to firms based outside them were largely
ineffective. Overall, the results reported in Table 7 suggest that the effect of the elimination of
ESR on the attractiveness of locating in SEZ dominated the negative effect on the intensive margin
of constrained exporters. Thus, granting access to the domestic market to firms in the zones has
helped in consolidating their importance in the export basket of the Dominican Republic — at
least in the short term.
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Table 7: Share of SEZ in Export Value and Number of Firms at the HS-6 Product-level
Export Value Number of Firms
[1] [2]
Post08t ✝ Priorityj 0.033 0.069***
(0.024) (0.019)
Post12t ✝Non-Priorityj 0.039 0.054**
(0.031) (0.025)
Observations 19,141 19,145
R2 0.055 0.109
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include HS-6 product and year
fixed effects as well as HS-2 product-specific linear trends. Robust standard
errors clustered at the HS-6 product level. ***, significant at the 1% level;
**, significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
Input Tariff Reductions for Non-SEZ Firms in Priority Sectors. Lastly, we investigate
whether the tariff cuts mandated by law 56-07 had any significant impact on the share of imports
of these products accounted for by SEZ across HS-6 products, both in terms of value and number
of importing firms. Thus, our estimating equation is given by:
ShrSEZjt ✏ β1♣Post08t ✝ Priority Inputjq   fj   ft   Tj˜t   εjt, (11)
where Priority Inputj takes the value 1 if HS-6 product j import tariff was set to zero under law
56-07, and all other control variables have been defined previously. Notice that since law 139-11
did not extend any import tariff reductions, equation (11) does not include an interaction term for
liberalized inputs after 2012.
As we discussed in Section 4, Table 5 shows that the most important goods (in terms of total
import value) that were made duty-free for non-SEZ firms operating in national priority sectors
were either almost exclusively imported by SEZ firms, or, general-purpose inputs imported by a
large number of firms in priority and non-priority sectors alike. Thus, we examine whether there is
a difference in the share of imports destined to SEZ depending on the importance of these goods
in the production of national priority sectors. Since we do not have an input-output table that
would allow us to categorize inputs as specific to priority sectors or general-purpose, we follow an
alternative strategy and classify each of the 126 HS-6 products liberalized as specific, if the first
two digits of their product nomenclature correspond to those of a national priority product. Thus,
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for instance, the HS-6 product ‘bovine leather’ is classified as a priority input because its first two
digits correspond to the leather goods sector, which is listed as a priority sector. Conversely, ‘white
spirit’, which is also a priority input, is instead considered to be a non-priority product. Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 8 present estimates of the following OLS regression that modifies equation
(11):
ShrSEZjt ✏ β1♣Post08t ✝ Priority Inputj ✝ Priority Productjq 
β2♣Post08t ✝ Priority Inputj ✝Non-Priority Productjq   fj   ft   Tj˜t   εjt, (11’)
Column (1) of Table 8 shows an insignificant reduction in the share of liberalized inputs imported
by SEZ firms after 2008, and similarly, column (2) reveals that there is no change in the share of
SEZ firms importing these goods either. Column (3), however, shows that the reduction in the
share of imports of priority inputs destined to SEZ occurred primarily among products that were
not used specifically by firms in the apparel, textiles and leather industries. If — as the results in
Table 8 imply — non-SEZ firms did not receive a sufficient boost in incentives after the removal of
ESR, tougher competition from SEZ firms in the domestic market could contribute to the rise in
the share of SEZ exports after the elimination of ESR.
Table 8: Share of SEZ in Import Value and Number of Firms at HS-6 Product-level
Import Value # Firms Import Value # Firms
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Post08t ✝ Priority inputj -0.033 -0.004
(0.021) (0.015)
Post08t ✝ Priority inputj ✝ Priorityj -0.019 0.034
(0.043) (0.036)
Post08t ✝ Priority inputj ✝Non-Priorityj -0.040* -0.022
(0.022) (0.013)
Observations 40,770 40,784 40,770 40,784
R2 0.018 0.029 0.018 0.029
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include HS-6 product and year fixed effects as well as HS-2 product-specific
linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the HS-6 product level. ***, significant at the 1% level; **,
significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
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6 Conclusions
For more than four decades the Dominican Republic has relied extensively on providing fiscal
incentives to firms located in special economic zones to promote exports. An instrumental element
of this developmental strategy was the requirement that firms located in SEZ had to export at least
80% of their output, thus limiting the extent of competition faced by local producers outside the
zones. The impending deadline to make the SEZ program compliant with the disciplines stipulated
by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures by December 2015, led to the
elimination of export share requirements in the SEZ. A distinctive feature of the reform strategy
pursued by the Dominican Republic — which we take advantage of in order to identify the impact
of the removal of ESR on the export performance of SEZ — was that the requirements were
eliminated in a staggered fashion over time and across different industries. Namely, the export
share requirement was first removed for producers of leather, textiles and apparel and leather, the
so called ‘national priority’ sectors in 2007, and afterwards for all SEZ producers in 2011.
From a theoretical standpoint, ESR distort the allocation of sales across domestic and export
markets for exporters taking advantage of the incentives available in SEZ, but that would prefer
to sell a higher share of their output locally than what the export requirement allows them to. On
the one hand, eliminating the constraint on domestic sales would induce these exporters to increase
the prices they charge abroad in order to reach their undistorted export intensity, thus reducing
export sales. On the other hand, removing the ESR while retaining the incentives available in SEZ,
would encourage firms to locate there, thereby increasing the share of exports originating from SEZ
for a given product. Since these two mechanisms work in opposite directions, the question of how
did the ESR reform affect the importance of SEZ exports — which is the focus of this paper — is
ultimately, an empirical one.
Our results show that removing the ESR in SEZ has made them a more attractive location
for firms to operate from in the Dominican Republic. Our empirical assessment of the response
of export margins to the elimination of ESR shows, in line with our theoretical framework, that
the reforms promoted entry into export markets within SEZ, while at the same time producing
a reduction in the value of export shipments for existing exporters in SEZ (although the latter
effect stops being significant when we focus on continuing exporters). When we look at how the
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importance of SEZ exports in narrowly-defined HS-6 products was affected by the two waves of
elimination of ESR, we find that the share of exporters from SEZ increased between 5.5 to 7
percentage points relative to the situation with ESR, whereas the increase in the share of export
value after the reforms was largely insignificant. These findings suggest that the lion’s share of
exports (in terms of value) originated in SEZ is accounted for by unconstrained exporters that did
not find the ESR constraint binding. Nevertheless, the entry of new exporters after the removal
of export requirements more than compensated the reduction in the value of individual export
shipments by established constrained exporters, and therefore, we see that the importance of SEZ
in terms of the number of exporting firms for a given product, increased following the reforms. In
regard to the objective of harmonizing the incentives between firms inside and outside SEZ, we find
that the tariff reductions introduced by law 56-07 did not provide a sufficiently strong boost, in
terms of the import behavior of firms relying on the national customs regime, to elicit a significant
change in the composition of exports in the Dominican Republic.
Overall, we conclude that at least in the short-run, making the special economic zones regime
compatible with WTO rules on export subsidies has not significantly diminished the Dominican
Republic’s reliance on the zones.
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